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DOES THE UNITARY PRESIDENCY REALLY NEED A 
NATIONALIST JUSTIFICATION? 
Jide Nzelibe* 
This Essay critically analyzes a functional justification often given for exclusive presidential 
control of the bureaucracy.  As put forth by proponents of the unitary presidency, this justification 
contends that the President has a more national constituency than Congress and thus is the only 
institutional actor who is consistently motivated to pursue goals that are nationwide in scope.  In 
addition to questioning the empirical premises of this justification, I also argue that it might 
actually undermine otherwise reasonable arguments in support of the unitary presidency. 
Given the constitutional ambiguity concerning the place of the 
bureaucracy in our system of separated powers,1 scholars and courts 
have frequently turned to instrumental (or functional) policy argu-
ments to justify exclusive presidential control of the administrative 
state.  One such recurring justification is that the presidency is the 
only branch of government that can consistently act as a bulwark 
against parochial policies and capture by interest groups.  This justifi-
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 1 Admittedly, the book that is the focus of this symposium—Calabresi and Yoo’s magisterial 
enterprise on the unitary executive—attempts to establish a solid historical foundation 
for the unitary presidency rather than engage the various functional arguments in this 
debate.  See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 14–15 (2008).  Nonetheless, functional 
explanations have played a key role in justifying the historical trends of presidential do-
minance depicted by Calabresi and Yoo.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Ar-
guments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 35 (1995) (“Representing as he does a 
national electoral college majority, the President at least has an incentive to steer national 
resources toward the 51% of the nation that last supported him (and that might support 
him again), thereby mitigating the bad distributional incentives faced by members of 
Congress.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2335 (2001) 
(“[B]ecause the President has a national constituency, he is likely to consider, in setting 
the direction of administrative policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general 
public, rather than merely parochial interests.”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 105–06 (1994) (“[B]ecause the Pres-
ident has a national constituency—unlike relevant members of Congress, who oversee in-
dependent agencies with often parochial agendas—it appears to operate as an important 
counterweight to factional influence over administration.”); Jerry L. Mashaw,  Prodelega-
tion:  Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) 
(“[I]t may make sense to imagine the delegation of political authority to administrators as 
a device for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires of the elector-
ate.”). 
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cation has significant intuitive appeal.  After all, as Calabresi has ob-
served in some of his other work, the President is the only official 
elected from a nationwide constituency.2 
In addition to suggesting that this oft-repeated claim about the 
President’s superior national mandate is empirically contestable, this 
Essay argues that it is actually unnecessary and even harmful to the 
aspirations of those who support the unitary presidency.  In other 
words, the argument for rationalizing a bureaucracy under central-
ized executive authority does not require that the President also an-
swer to a broader audience than Congress.  Indeed, taken to its logi-
cal conclusion, the nationalist justification would support an imperial 
President whose views should prevail whenever there is an inter-
branch conflict over policy issues.  Since even the most ardent sup-
porters of the unitary presidency do not want to go that far, the na-
tionalist justification is at best an unnecessary distraction in the de-
bates over the role of the political branches in the administrative 
state. 
The Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I critically examines the em-
pirical assumptions underpinning claims about the nationalist Presi-
dent.  Part II suggests that the nationalist presidency assumption has 
no obvious analytical payoff for those who seek to defend the unitary 
President.  Even if the incentive to be responsive to the desires of the 
national median voter is normatively desirable in certain contexts, it 
will often be problematic in the context of the administrative state 
where technocratic judgments often trump political ones.  Part III 
suggests that since there are otherwise reasonable functional argu-
ments for vesting control of the administrative state in the President, 
proponents of the unitary President should abandon the weak and 
potentially harmful nationalist justification. 
I.  HISTORY AND SOME EMPIRICAL PREMISES 
The historical antecedents of the nationalist justification can 
probably be traced back to the presidency of Andrew Jackson.  As Ca-
labresi and Yoo observe, Jackson first invoked the President’s unique 
nationalist pedigree in his battle with Congress over the Bank of the 
United States.  The President, Jackson declared, is the “direct repre-
sentative of the American people.”3  But it was Woodrow Wilson, as a 
political scientist, who gave the nationalist justification its contempo-
 
 2 See Calabresi, supra note 1, at 35. 
 3 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 114. 
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rary intellectual moorings.  In Constitutional Government in the United 
States, Wilson opined that “[t]here is no national party choice except 
that of President.  No one else represents the people as a whole, ex-
ercising a national choice; . . . . [The President] is the representative 
of no constituency, but of the whole people.”4  Since Wilson’s decla-
ration, this nationalist claim has been trumpeted in all kinds of sepa-
ration of powers debates, including most significantly those used to 
justify the unitary President.5 
At first blush, any President’s efforts to work around the pur-
ported grandees of Capitol Hill might seem not only defensible but 
desirable.  After all, if the President is the lone representative of the 
national majority, one might plausibly think that his or her views 
should be given significant if not decisive weight whenever there is a 
disagreement with Congress.  The Supreme Court seemed to hint at 
such a plebiscitary justification for broad presidential powers in Myers 
v. United States: 
The President is a representative of the people just as the members of the 
Senate and of the House are, and it may be, at some times, on some sub-
jects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more represen-
tative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature 
whose constituencies are local and not countrywide. . . .6 
But this nationalist assumption rests on very questionable empiri-
cal premises.  That the President is the only nationally elected official 
does not necessarily mean that his constituency is broader than that 
of Congress as an institution.  More simply, the relevant baseline for 
comparison is not between the President and any single member of 
Congress, but between the President and the accommodating median 
legislator in our bicameral legislative system.  When framed this way, 
 
 4 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (paperback 
ed. 1961). 
 5 See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State:  Beyond the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 875–76 (1997) (observing that the President’s ple-
biscitary connection to the median voter has been used to justify control over administra-
tive agencies); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State:  Why a Unitary, 
Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 
833–34 (1996) (describing both sides of the separation of powers debate); see also Cala-
bresi, supra note 1, at 35 (contrasting Congress’s parochial mindset with the President’s 
national outlook); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Ex-
ecute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 548–50 (1994)(arguing that originalist textual and his-
torical arguments support the unitary President’s control over the administrative arms of 
government); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 533, 591 (1989) (“Some independent agencies make policy that is vitally 
important to our national life; hence presidential interest in its formation is both inevita-
ble and proper.”). 
 6 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926). 
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the foundation of the nationalist President assumption starts to 
buckle under its own majoritarian logic.  For in the United States, it is 
plausible that the President can maintain a minimum winning coali-
tion in the electoral college by focusing on eleven of the most popu-
lous states and half of the voters in half of the electoral districts—i.e., 
twenty-five percent of the electorate.7  But the minimum winning coa-
lition of the median member of Congress in our bicameral system re-
quires that such a legislator represent policies favored not only by 
half of the states (the median Senator) but also by at least half of the 
voters in half of the electoral districts (the median member of the 
House of Representatives).8 
Thus, if one resorts to the crude mechanism of determining win-
ning coalitions by counting heads, the constituency of the median 
member of Congress could sometimes be both geographically broad-
er and more numerous than that of the President.  Nonetheless, in 
this age of the rhetorical President who is subject to constant and of-
ten withering media scrutiny,9 one may argue that it may be better 
that the responsibility for the administrative state be lodged in the 
most politically vulnerable figure, especially if the President often 
comes close to enjoying electoral mandates.  If so, then relying on the 
nationalist President assumption to justify presidential control might 
simply be an expedient rule that has most traction when a President 
enjoys widespread electoral support.  Unfortunately, however, this 
justification is also inadequate because it does not necessarily support 
the argument for a unitary President; indeed, as discussed in the next 
Part, it tends to support an imperial President who can unilaterally 
legislate whenever national policy goals are at stake. 
Beyond the empirical problems discussed above, the notion of a 
presidential mandate may also be problematic on other grounds.  
Since the Constitution establishes separate elections for national offi-
cials in our tricameral system, episodes of divided government are 
not uncommon.  And given the contemporary trends suggesting the 
lack of unified party control of government,10 it is less likely that Pres-
 
 7 A more detailed version of this argument appears in Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the National-
ist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1231–46 (2006) (detailing 
how presidential candidates only need to persuade twenty-five percent of the electorate to 
establish a winning coalition). 
 8 Id. at 1231–33. 
 9 See JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 118–32 (1987) (suggesting that the 
plebiscitary President has changed the original constitutional conception of the presi-
dency). 
 10 See Stephen Slivinski, Would Divided Government Be Better?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 3, 2006, 
available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/viewpoints/articles/
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idents will find the requisite political capital to push their agenda 
through Congress. 
Thus, even when Presidents garner large electoral majorities, the 
significance of such mandates—from the perspective of the median 
voter—is unclear.  For instance, in 1984, the same year that Reagan 
won by a landslide, Democrats also won a majority of the congres-
sional vote.  Given such a conflicting electoral picture, what does one 
make of Reagan’s mandate?  Is there any reason to assume that the 
interest groups that might have benefited from Reagan’s ascendancy 
were imbued with a greater aura of public interest than the groups 
whose preferences were supported by the Democratic congressional 
majority?  Similarly, what does one make of the stretch of divided 
government that characterized much of Clinton’s presidency?  In all 
these cases, the possibility that inter-branch conflict over control of 
the bureaucracy might reflect competition among various interest 
groups is largely ignored by proponents of the nationalist President.  
For instance, repetitive claims as to how free trade Presidents stand 
up to a protectionist Congress sidestep the reality that the political 
demand for free trade is often itself encouraged by special interest 
groups, i.e., export-seeking market access to foreign markets.  And 
such political branch preferences on trade are not a one-way street—
when President Bush decided to raise tariffs on steel in 2003, he got 
significant push-back from members of Congress who represent ex-
port-oriented constituencies.11 
But there is yet another significant problem with emphasizing the 
President’s nationalist pedigree in a manner that is divorced from the 
institutional context in which voters choose their leaders.  Take, for 
instance, the British parliamentary model.  When Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown and his Labour Party are in power, they usually have 
the ability to implement their policy agenda with little or no com-
promise.  In the American system, by contrast, the winning party in a 
presidential election often faces a long and tortuous path from elec-
tions to policy results, with many instances of legislative logrolling 
 
0903slivinski0903.html (“Divided government is the norm, not the exception, in modern 
American politics. Over the past 42 years, for instance, there were only 13 in which united 
control of the legislative and executive branches of government existed at the federal lev-
el.”). 
 11 See Elizabeth Becker, For Bush, A Janus-Like View of Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at C1 
(observing that Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee was urging the end of steel tariffs 
on behalf of export companies); Michael E. Kanell & Matthew C. Quinn, Democratic Pros-
pects Alive in South, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 6, 2003, at A1 (observing that senatorial De-
mocratic candidate Mary Landrieu “railed against Bush for tariffs on foreign steel that 
moves through the state’s ports, costing Louisiana ‘thousands of jobs’”). 
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and bargaining with other elected officials along the way.  Thus, one 
might assume that rational voters in both the British parliamentary 
and the American systems would have to factor in the institutional 
path to policy outcomes when they make their choices.  For instance, 
a moderate voter in the United States might vote for a presidential 
candidate not because she endorses the candidate’s views on most 
policy issues, but because the voter assumes the resultant inter-branch 
compromise might produce an outcome that is close to what she 
wants.12  In other words, unlike a voter in the British parliamentary 
who has a clear incentive to vote his or her true preferences, the voter 
in the American system may tend to overshoot to compensate for the 
fact that the candidate has to make compromises to reach a policy 
outcome.  In this institutional environment, if we think that that the 
median voter might anticipate that the President has to engage in 
bargaining and logrolling at the legislation production stage, it is also 
reasonable to assume that the voter might also anticipate similar bar-
gaining and compromise at the policy implementation stage.  After 
all, the voter has no reason to make fine-grained distinctions between 
agency action and legislation at the ballot box, since presumably both 
are institutional vehicles that elected officials might deploy to alter 
the policy status quo. 
To summarize, the theory of the nationalist President, which as-
sumes that a majority of voters prefer the policy vision of the Presi-
dent to that of Congress, is both empirically contestable and theoreti-
cally problematic.  At bottom, the interaction between voter 
preferences and institutional context is actually too complex to sup-
port any strong inferences about the scope of the President’s political 
support vis-à-vis Congress. 
II.  THE QUESTIONABLE PAYOFF OF THE NATIONALIST JUSTIFICATION 
One may argue that although the nationalist justification is perva-
sive in discussions of the unitary presidency, it has not necessarily 
been embraced by pro-President scholars in absolute terms.  These 
scholars are likely aware that modern Presidents do not routinely en-
joy obvious mandates; indeed, since the advent of modern polling in 
the twentieth century, the cases of Presidents enjoying clear mandates 
are few and far between—Reagan won by a landslide in 1984, Nixon 
in 1972, but for the most part clear presidential mandates look more 
 
 12 Orit Kedar has made a similar argument about voter behavior across different parliamen-
tary systems.  See Orit Kedar, When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties:  Policy Balancing in 
Parliamentary Elections, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 185 (2005). 
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like the exception than the norm.  Perhaps these scholars are sug-
gesting that although decisive mandates are not necessarily frequent, 
circumstances where Presidents win by bare minimum coalitions are 
also rare.  And given the risks that influential congressional outliers—
such as committee chairs—may capture agencies for parochial pur-
poses, we may want to rely on presidential control of such agencies as 
the most expedient way to accomplish truly national policy goals. 
But even this more modest version of the nationalist justification 
is unpersuasive.  First, even though an appeal to majoritarian senti-
ments may be a desirable objective in the traditional legislative arena, 
it may be less relevant in presidential management of the administra-
tive state.  Second, and more importantly, the nationalist justifica-
tion—at least as espoused by unitary President scholars—would also 
support an imperial President whose views would trumpet that of 
Congress whenever there are disagreements over legislative priorities.  
But even the most ardent unitary President scholars would not go 
that far. 
A.  The Tension Between Administrative Oversight and Political 
Accountability 
Supporters of the unitary President tend to assimilate both the 
roles of the President as overseer of the administrative state and the 
most politically accountable actor.13  But there are often going to be 
obvious inconsistencies between these two roles.  Presumably, as over-
seer of the administrative state, the President is supposed to act as a 
loyal steward who carries out the policy goals already dictated by the 
legislative process.  In other words, he should dutifully limit the scope 
of his constitutional duties to ensure “that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”14  Yet it is reasonable to assume that the political President—
as the sole representative of a temporary electoral majority—will of-
ten find his political agenda in conflict with his stewardship role. 
This tension is material, not only because the President’s adminis-
trative and political roles may not overlap, but because the Presi-
dent’s political motivations may often be antithetical to the aspira-
tions of bureaucratic rationalization.  For instance, one way to ensure 
efficiency and legitimacy of the administrative state is to reduce the 
haphazard and arbitrary effect of bureaucratic programs.  But as Lisa 
Bressman has shown, the emphasis on the President’s political ac-
countability in the literature has obfuscated this first-order principle 
 
 13 See Calabresi, supra note 1, at 35–37. 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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of bureaucratic rationality.15  In other words, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the President’s desire to push his or her political agenda 
may lead to outcomes that undermine the twin goals of efficiency and 
non-arbitrariness, especially when Presidents are pushing policy 
agendas that differ markedly from those of their predecessors.16  In-
deed, even Elena Kagan—a prominent advocate of the unitary execu-
tive—concedes that the President’s political goals might sometimes 
conflict with administrative values.17  More importantly, the existing 
empirical research on the connection between administrative efficacy 
and political accountability does not look too promising.  As one re-
cent study suggests, White House involvement over one agency—the 
Environmental Protection Agency—did not enhance regulatory effi-
cacy as defined by invigorating regulatory change, although it may 
have induced the agency to accommodate ongoing political priori-
ties.18 Of course, one study or a handful of case studies do not make 
for a strong generalization, but it seems plausible that the President’s 
motivations to respond to present electoral realities will often be in 
conflict with the executive management role. 
B.  The Perverse Implications of the Nationalist Justification 
One of the most contentious issues in contemporary analysis of 
public law is the significant ambiguity and slippage between conven-
tional agency action and traditional legislation.  I do not seek, how-
ever, to engage the vast normative literature on the non-delegation 
doctrine and its implications.19  For the purposes of this analysis, it 
 
 15 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:  Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Adminis-
trative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 461–69, 495–96 (2003) (arguing that commentators 
have focused on accountability in the administrative state to the exclusion of the value of 
avoiding arbitrary decisions). 
 16 Mark Tushnet provides some support for this observation in his contribution to this sym-
posium.  See Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Presidency, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 313 (discussing Reagan’s efforts to restructure the long-standing New 
Deal order during his presidency). 
 17 See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2352 (“An aggressive presidential stance toward administration 
nonetheless may diminish the proper influence of expertise in discrete and important 
cases; for this reason, some hesitation is warranted in applying (or countenancing the ap-
plication of) the methods of presidential administration to a select category of adminis-
trative decisions—essentially, those most scientific or otherwise technical in nature and, 
as such, least connected to political judgment.”). 
 18 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:  A 
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 51–52 (2006)(noting 
that the EPA often is willing to accommodate the President’s desire to appease narrow in-
terests that also serve national policy interests). 
 19 Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1721 (2002)(rejecting the nondelegation doctrine as a grant of power provided by 
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suffices to note that contemporary Presidents—and by extension 
agency heads—have considerable latitude to carry out policy initia-
tives that alter the political status quo. Given this similarity between 
agency action and legislation, nationalist arguments that find wisdom 
in giving the President exclusive control over agencies should also 
presumably support giving the President the power to ignore Con-
gress whenever there is inter-branch conflict regarding the wisdom of 
legislative priorities. 
Of course, no proponent of the unitary President wants to go that 
far. Actually, supporters of the unitary presidency are often keen to 
disassociate themselves from any open-ended claims for the expan-
sion of executive power at Congress’s expense.20  More importantly, 
these scholars also explicitly distinguish the role of the President as 
administrative overseer and his role as co-participant in the legislative 
process.  Indeed, Calabresi and Yoo make it clear that they are agnos-
tic about the scope of presidential power and are quite critical of the 
Bush administration’s efforts to advance an ambitious vision of in-
herent executive branch authority.21 
But the selective commitment by unitary scholars to the national-
ist justification—in this case, applying it to agency action and not to 
legislation—is quite puzzling.  Suppose we have a genuine constitu-
tional impasse between the President and Congress where the Presi-
dent prefers legislative proposal A because of his nationalist pedigree, 
whereas Congress prefers proposal B because of its parochial outlook.  
Why, pursuant to the nationalist justification, should courts not allow 
the President’s preference to trump that of Congress?  Indeed, the 
concerns about the parochial incentives of members of Congress in 
the administrative arena ought to apply, at an even greater level, to 
the actual production of legislation. 
A proponent of the unitary presidency might attempt to sidestep 
this issue by pointing to textual provisions that explicitly give Con-
gress a role to play in the legislative arena.  But not much in the na-
tionalist justification for the unitary President is tied explicitly to tex-
tual considerations because the Constitution is largely silent on the 
question of the administrative state.  Thus, aside from first-order tex-
tual considerations, there is no obvious reason why the very national-
ist justification that supports exclusive presidential control over the 
 
Congress), with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doc-
trine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003)(explaining the impor-
tance and existence of the nondelection doctrine). 
 20 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 429–30. 
 21 See id. 
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administrative state would not also support an imperial President in 
the legislative realm. 
To be fair, however, even the most forceful proponents of the uni-
tary President concede that a single presidential election is a subop-
timal mechanism for measuring the popular will.  Indeed, as Calabre-
si has argued convincingly elsewhere, our tricameral system of 
government allows for a more accurate sampling of the popular will 
than a unilateral approach such as the Westminster parliamentary 
model.22  Moreover, such a tricameral system helps ensure that any 
piece of legislation enjoys the support of enduring majorities.23  But 
again the key question still remains:  Why would such considerations 
not also hold in the context of administrative agency action? 
One might attempt to dilute this concern by distinguishing be-
tween Congress’s motivations when it exercises oversight over admin-
istrative agencies and when it legislates.  Building on the committee 
control literature,24 one might argue that although the median mem-
ber of Congress might be the key player with respect to lawmaking, 
such a member might not necessarily the key player with respect to 
congressional oversight of executive branch agencies.25  With respect 
to the latter role, the relevant referent point for determining con-
gressional preferences might be the median member of the congres-
sional committee charged with oversight of the relevant agency.26  If 
this is true, then there is reason to be concerned that this median 
committee member might tend to be more parochial and subject to 
interest-group capture than either the median legislator or the Presi-
dent. 
Such distinctions are unconvincing.  Any concerns about the pos-
sible disproportionate influence of congressional committees at the 
level of agency oversight should also apply, in very much the same 
way, to the lawmaking process.  In other words, not much in the lit-
erature that emphasizes the committee control approach is tied to 
 
 22 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government:  Why Professor Ackerman is 
Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 56–58 (2001). 
 23 See id. 
 24 See Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; Or, Why 
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 143–55 (1988) 
(developing model with committees as key decisionmaking body and arguing that Con-
gress appears to function similarly). 
 25 See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas K. Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled 
Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1702–03 (“There are big differences in the way Congress 
undertakes lawmaking and the way in which it supervises, controls, and oversees law exe-
cution. . . . The congressional role in law execution is done almost entirely through the 
committees and predominantly by the committee chairs.”). 
 26 See id. 
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differences between legislation and agency oversight; indeed, the 
relevant institutional mechanisms are not sufficiently fine-grained to 
make such distinctions.27  Thus, the same committee members who 
tend to influence agencies will presumably be as influential in the leg-
islative process.  If what is good for the goose is good for the gander, 
then unitary President proponents should also advocate for severely 
circumscribing Congress’s legislative role. 
More importantly, however, the problem with this kind of argu-
ment is that it is built around highly contested empirical and theo-
retical premises.  First, much of the literature of congressional moti-
vation revolves around a major point of contention:  whether 
Congress’s institutional preferences are best determined by the pref-
erences of the median floor member,28 the median committee mem-
ber,29 or the median member of the majority party.30  Despite the con-
victions of scholars within each camp, the relevant empirical evidence 
on this question is controversial although one study suggests that it is 
the median floor member’s preferences that prevail.31  Furthermore, 
there is not much evidence to suggest that the median committee 
member will necessarily be more parochial or subject to agency cap-
ture than either the median floor member or the President.  Indeed, 
in another study, Krehbiel shows that committee outliers are rare and 
that most committee members have preferences close to that of the 
median floor member.32  Nor can one argue that it is intuitively obvi-
ous that a committee control approach will have a debilitating effect.  
On the contrary, as some political scientists have observed, deference to 
committees might actually improve the overall level of congressional 
deliberation because of the informational benefits of greater speciali-
zation.33  Admittedly, other political scientists have also speculated 
 
 27 See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 24, at 151 (finding that members of congressional 
committees play a significant role in the production of legislation). 
 28 See KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 263 (1991) (articulat-
ing “[t]he Median Legislator Hypothesis” that “[l]egislative choices in salient policy do-
mains are median choices”). 
 29 See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 24, at 143–55 (developing model with committees as 
key decisionmaking body and arguing that Congress appears to function similarly). 
 30 See, e.g., GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN:  PARTY 
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 77–125 (1993) (arguing that the party in control of the 
chamber is the key decision-making body). 
 31 KREHBIEL, supra note 28, at 263–65. 
 32 See Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?, 84 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 149, 150, 158–61 (1990) (arguing that committee members are probably not 
preference outliers).  But cf. Marshall & Weingast, supra note 24, at 143–48 (suggesting 
that committee members might tend to be outliers). 
 33 See Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a 
Heterogeneous Committee, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459, 485 (1989) (showing that allocating the 
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that the median committee member might be more prone to agency 
capture then the floor median,34 but there does not seem to be much 
empirical support for this claim. 
To summarize, there is no systematic evidence that suggests that 
the preferences of median committee members determine congres-
sional preferences at either the legislative or agency oversight level.  
And even if it were true, there is no systematic evidence that suggests 
it would be bad from a public welfare perspective; indeed, there is 
some suggestive evidence that it would be benign.  In any event, tai-
loring constitutional design to address scenarios that are either highly 
speculative or that lack a solid empirical foundation is not a good 
idea. 
At bottom, by suggesting that the President is the only branch that 
can truly transcend parochial politics, the nationalist justification ele-
vates the President to a role within our constitutional system that 
transcends being the mere head of the administrative state.  Indeed, 
the full import of the nationalist President justification is that it sug-
gests that whenever there is a possibility of parochial capture by nar-
row interests groups, the courts and the voters ought to defer to the 
views of the President.  Thus, to the extent that unitary President 
supporters are averse to embracing an imperial presidency with mon-
archist pretensions, the nationalist justification might actually hurt 
their cause.  Indeed, as discussed in Part III below, there are better 
and more narrowly construed functional arguments that might sup-
port the unitary presidency.  Thus, at best, the nationalist justification 
is an unnecessary distraction in the debates about presidential con-
trol of the administrative state. 
III.  THE RESILIENCE OF OTHER FUNCTIONALIST ARGUMENTS FOR THE 
UNITARY PRESIDENCY 
The observation that the nationalist presidency assumption might 
be both empirically questionable and theoretically problematic does 
not necessarily undermine the functional rationale for a unitary pres-
idency.  As numerous commentators have observed, the President 
might enjoy both collective action and resource advantages over 
Congress in superintending the administrative state.  As Kagan ar-
gued in her seminal 2001 article: 
 
power to propose and amend policies to committees at the expense of Congress leads to 
more informative decisions). 
 34 See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 24, at 143–48. 
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[The President has] the capacity to achieve set objectives, without undue 
cost, in an expeditious and coherent manner.  Moreover, a President, by 
virtue of the attributes of his office, stands in a relatively good position to 
achieve these operational goals.  Because he is a unitary actor, he can act 
without the indecision and inefficiency that so often characterize the be-
havior of collective entities.35 
In other words, setting aside questions of accountability, there are 
plausible instrumental arguments for presidential control of the bu-
reaucracy that are rooted in the unity of the President’s office.  
Against the background of Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives, for in-
stance, one can reasonably argue that the President has both the 
most institutional resources and capacity to manage and coordinate 
the proliferation of new government agencies and programs.  In this 
picture, the appeal of rationalizing the bureaucracy under the Presi-
dent assumes that many aspects of the bureaucracy can be working at 
cross purposes and that the President—as a singular official—is better 
positioned to coordinate the bureaucracy than a diffuse and collec-
tive institution like Congress. 
Admittedly, the observation that the President might enjoy collec-
tive action and coordination advantages over Congress in the admini-
stration of the bureaucracy could have accountability implications.  If 
Congress is entrusted with overseeing the bureaucracy, for instance, 
its collective action problems might prevent necessary coalitions from 
forming to provide the requisite level of competent oversight.  In 
such an institutional framework, one might plausibly argue that the 
members of Congress who have an incentive to be involved are going 
to be those who have the most intense preferences regarding the 
agency’s mission and goals.  Such members might not necessarily 
constitute a representative sample of Congress; indeed, in many cir-
cumstances, they might either be members of the committee with ju-
risdiction over the agency or those members whose constituents are 
most affected by the agency’s policy output.  As discussed earlier, 
however, the notion that committee members are parochial outliers 
is highly debatable.36  Nonetheless, to the extent such an accountabil-
ity deficit account is plausible, it is not necessarily one rooted in Con-
gress’s preference as an institution, but merely a peculiar artifact of 
its collective decision-making process.  Thus, to the extent that such 
collective action problems can be mitigated, these accountability is-
sues can be addressed as well. 
 
 35 Kagan, supra note 1, at 2339. 
 36 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
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Notwithstanding the plausible strength of the collective action jus-
tification, not everyone accepts its core empirical premises.  As Cyn-
thia Farina notes in her contribution to this Symposium, the modern 
executive branch is a fairly diffuse and sprawling entity and may very 
well suffer from some of the same collective action problems that 
plague Congress.37  In other words, given the sheer size of the execu-
tive branch, she observes that the transaction costs of pushing 
through coherent policy goals through its various layers and decision 
points are quite significant.  But such observations are not necessarily 
fatal to the unitary President theory.  At most, they suggest that uni-
tary President proponents ought to be more rigorous and refined in 
specifying their institutional premises and how they affect policy out-
put. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Essay has taken a critical stance towards a key justification for 
the unitary presidency—the assumption that the President’s national 
constituency makes him a counterpoise to Congress’s parochial ten-
dencies.  More specifically, it contends that this nationalist justifica-
tion is not only empirically questionable, but is also an unnecessary 
distraction in ongoing debates about the scope of the President’s au-
thority over the administrative state.  Ultimately, even if this claim 
about the President’s superior nationalist pedigree is correct, its im-
plications would cut clearly beyond the administrative state because it 
suggests that on other national policy issues, including legislative 
proposals, Congress should play second fiddle to the President.  
Viewed in this light, the nationalist justification could serve as a po-
tent tool in the hands of modern plebiscitary executives who seek to 
curb legislative checks on their power.  But not even the most force-
ful advocates of the unitary presidency are willing to embrace such an 
expansive notion of executive authority. 
Of course, none of these criticisms necessarily undermine the case 
for the unitary presidency.  On the contrary, there may be other in-
strumental reasons—rooted in the President’s collective action ad-
vantage over Congress—why one may still prefer exclusive presiden-
tial control over the bureaucracy. 
 
 
 
 37 Cynthia Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises:  Uncertainty, Information Overload, and 
the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357 (2010). 
